Understanding how individuals form and update their beliefs is a fundamental question in cognitive and social psychology. Belief formation (BF) refers to the initial development of an individual's belief, while belief updating (BU) pertains to the revision of existing beliefs in response to contradictory evidence. Although these two processes are often interwoven, they might operate through different neural mechanisms. This meta-analysis aims to synthesize the existing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) literature on BF and BU, with a particular focus on how BF is investigated. Approaches based on Theory of Mind paradigms, such as False Belief tasks, are often opposed to other approaches, emphasizing the role of individual or situational factors in belief formation. Notably, we propose that this differentiation might reflect the engagement of social and non-social dynamics within belief formation. Activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analysis revealed shared involvement of the Precuneus (PCu) in both BF and BU, while BF specifically engaged the bilateral activation of the Temporo-Parietal Junctions (TPJ). Additionally, social and non-social BF exhibited distinct neural correlates: social BF was associated with activity in the right TPJ, whereas non-social BF relied on the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). These findings support the hypothesis that BF and BU operate via partially dissociable neural networks and highlights the role of TPJ and PCu as essential hubs to build-up neural templates and enabling shifts in viewpoint necessary to adapt beliefs.
"Don’t stop believing" - Decoding belief dynamics in the brain: An ALE meta-analysis of neural correlates in belief formation and updating / Lo Presti, S.; Bonavita, M.; Piga, V.; Lozito, S.; Doricchi, F.; Lasaponara, S.. - In: NEUROSCIENCE AND BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS. - ISSN 0149-7634. - 173:(2025). [10.1016/j.neubiorev.2025.106153]
"Don’t stop believing" - Decoding belief dynamics in the brain: An ALE meta-analysis of neural correlates in belief formation and updating
Lo Presti, S.Formal Analysis
;Piga, V.Validation
;Lozito, S.Validation
;Doricchi, F.Writing – Review & Editing
;Lasaponara, S.
Conceptualization
2025
Abstract
Understanding how individuals form and update their beliefs is a fundamental question in cognitive and social psychology. Belief formation (BF) refers to the initial development of an individual's belief, while belief updating (BU) pertains to the revision of existing beliefs in response to contradictory evidence. Although these two processes are often interwoven, they might operate through different neural mechanisms. This meta-analysis aims to synthesize the existing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) literature on BF and BU, with a particular focus on how BF is investigated. Approaches based on Theory of Mind paradigms, such as False Belief tasks, are often opposed to other approaches, emphasizing the role of individual or situational factors in belief formation. Notably, we propose that this differentiation might reflect the engagement of social and non-social dynamics within belief formation. Activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analysis revealed shared involvement of the Precuneus (PCu) in both BF and BU, while BF specifically engaged the bilateral activation of the Temporo-Parietal Junctions (TPJ). Additionally, social and non-social BF exhibited distinct neural correlates: social BF was associated with activity in the right TPJ, whereas non-social BF relied on the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). These findings support the hypothesis that BF and BU operate via partially dissociable neural networks and highlights the role of TPJ and PCu as essential hubs to build-up neural templates and enabling shifts in viewpoint necessary to adapt beliefs.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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