This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It particularly provides a behavioral rationale for different pricing patterns, including Edgeworth price cycles and states of hyper-competition with supply shortages. We also analyze the impact of a change in firm size distribution. A merger among the biggest firms may lead to more price dispersion as it increases the maximum and decreases the minimum myopically stable price.
Myopic Oligopoly Pricing / Bos, Iwan; Marini, Marco A.; Saulle, Riccardo D.. - In: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. - ISSN 0899-8256. - 145:(2024), pp. 377-412. [10.1016/j.geb.2024.03.014]
Myopic Oligopoly Pricing
Marco A. Marini
Co-primo
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
2024
Abstract
This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria when capacities are large or small. For an intermediate range of capacities, it predicts a price interval that includes the mixed-strategy support. This stability concept thus encompasses all Nash equilibria and offers a pure-strategy solution when there is none in Nash terms. It particularly provides a behavioral rationale for different pricing patterns, including Edgeworth price cycles and states of hyper-competition with supply shortages. We also analyze the impact of a change in firm size distribution. A merger among the biggest firms may lead to more price dispersion as it increases the maximum and decreases the minimum myopically stable price.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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