Unitary executive claims e tutela dei consumatori nel settore finanziario alla luce della sentenza Seila Law

In June 2020 the Supreme Court of the United States issued a critical decision in the case Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 591 U.S. __(2020). The ruling held 5-4 that the single-Director structure of the CFPB, an independent agency established through the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, violates the Constitution’s separation of powers. It also ruled 7-2 that the proper remedy is to sever the Director’s statutory for cause removal restriction, thereby making the Director removable by the President at will. This paper aims to address the main traits of the decision. After a brief introduction, and an outline on the role and history of the CFPB, attention is given to the ‘unitary executive theory’ and its implementation in the Court’s reasoning. Thence, by commenting on the role of analogous independent bodies in the Italian and European experience, the paper remarks the threats the ruling poses to an effective and enabling regulation in the financial sector.