In this paper, we construct a theoretical game model with incomplete information to analyze the tax revenues of a multiethnic country, when fiscal corruption is widespread. Our proposal is that income inequality between ethnic groups causes differences leading to prejudice and discrimination among ethnic groups themselves and, as a consequence, this affects the control of corruption and evasion. Hence, the amount of tax revenues is proven to be dependent on the relevance of the income distribution between the ethnic groups.

A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption / Cerqueti, Roy; Coppier, Raffaella. - In: ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. - ISSN 1572-9338. - 243(1):(2016), pp. 71-87. [10.1007/s10479-014-1567-9]

A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption

CERQUETI, ROY;COPPIER, RAFFAELLA
2016

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a theoretical game model with incomplete information to analyze the tax revenues of a multiethnic country, when fiscal corruption is widespread. Our proposal is that income inequality between ethnic groups causes differences leading to prejudice and discrimination among ethnic groups themselves and, as a consequence, this affects the control of corruption and evasion. Hence, the amount of tax revenues is proven to be dependent on the relevance of the income distribution between the ethnic groups.
2016
Game theory; corruption; tax evasion; tax revenues; ethnolinguistic fractionalization; income inequality
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
A game theoretical analysis of the impact of income inequality and ethnic diversity on fiscal corruption / Cerqueti, Roy; Coppier, Raffaella. - In: ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. - ISSN 1572-9338. - 243(1):(2016), pp. 71-87. [10.1007/s10479-014-1567-9]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1364596
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