We propose an evolutionary game to analyse the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.
Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective / Cerqueti, Roy; Luca, Correani; Giuseppe, Garofalo. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - 120(3):(2013), pp. 458-463. [10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032]
Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective
CERQUETI, ROY;
2013
Abstract
We propose an evolutionary game to analyse the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.File allegati a questo prodotto
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