For Kant empirical concepts are general representations and intuitions are singular representations. Do proper names stand for intuitions? No, because Kant associates proper names to ‘singular concepts’. This association doesn’t contradict his claim that empirical concepts are general because singular concepts differ from intuitions. For, intuitions are given before all thought, while singular concepts are not, and this is why they can be designated by linguistic expressions like proper names. Moreover, it is exactly because a proper names doesn’t stand for an intuition that, when knowledge is at stake, we have to check whether there an intuition corresponding to it.
Per Kant i concetti empirici sono rappresentazioni generali e le intuizioni sono rappresentazioni singolari. I nomi propri stanno per intuizioni? No, perché Kant associa i nomi propri ai 'concetti singolari'. Questa associazione non contraddice l’affermazione che i concetti empirici sono generali, perché i concetti singolari differiscono dalle intuizioni. Infatti, le intuizioni sono date prima di ogni pensiero, mentre concetti singolari no, ed è per questo che possono trovare un’espressione linguistica. Inoltre, è proprio perché un nome proprio non sta per un’intuizione che, quando è in gioco la conoscenza, dobbiamo verificare se c'è un'intuizione corrispondente ad esso. For Kant empirical concepts are general representations and intuitions are singular representations. Do proper names stand for intuitions? No, because Kant associates proper names to ‘singular concepts’. This association doesn’t contradict his claim that empirical concepts are general because singular concepts differ from intuitions. For, intuitions are given before all thought, while singular concepts are not, and this is why they can be designated by linguistic expressions like proper names. Moreover, it is exactly because a proper names doesn’t stand for an intuition that, when knowledge is at stake, we have to check whether there an intuition corresponding to it.
La teoria kantiana dei concetti e il problema dei nomi propri / Capozzi, Mirella. - In: DIANOIA. - ISSN 1125-1514. - STAMPA. - 14:(2009), pp. 119-146.
La teoria kantiana dei concetti e il problema dei nomi propri
CAPOZZI, Mirella
2009
Abstract
For Kant empirical concepts are general representations and intuitions are singular representations. Do proper names stand for intuitions? No, because Kant associates proper names to ‘singular concepts’. This association doesn’t contradict his claim that empirical concepts are general because singular concepts differ from intuitions. For, intuitions are given before all thought, while singular concepts are not, and this is why they can be designated by linguistic expressions like proper names. Moreover, it is exactly because a proper names doesn’t stand for an intuition that, when knowledge is at stake, we have to check whether there an intuition corresponding to it.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.