We introduce the notion of rate-limited secure function evaluation (RL-SFE). Loosely speaking, in an RL-SFE protocol participants can monitor and limit the number of distinct inputs (i.e., rate) used by their counterparts in multiple executions of an SFE, in a private and verifiable manner. The need for RL-SFE naturally arises in a variety of scenarios: e.g., it enables service providers to “meter” their customers’ usage without compromising their privacy, or can be used to prevent oracle attacks against SFE constructions. We consider three variants of RL-SFE providing different levels of security. As a stepping stone, we also formalize the notion of commit-first SFE (CF-SFE) wherein parties are committed to their inputs before each SFE execution. We provide compilers for transforming any CF-SFE protocol into each of the three RL-SFE variants. Our compilers are accompanied with simulation-based proofs of security in the standard model and show a clear tradeoff between the level of security offered and the overhead required. Moreover, motivated by the fact that in many client-server applications clients do not keep state, we also describe a general approach for transforming the resulting RL-SFE protocols into stateless ones. As a case study, we take a closer look at the oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) protocol of Hazay and Lindell, show that it is commit-first, and instantiate efficient ratelimited variants of it.

Rate-limited secure function evaluation / Dagdelen, Özgür; Mohassel, Payman; Venturi, Daniele. - In: THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE. - ISSN 0304-3975. - 653:(2016), pp. 53-78. [10.1016/j.tcs.2016.09.020]

Rate-limited secure function evaluation

VENTURI, DANIELE
2016

Abstract

We introduce the notion of rate-limited secure function evaluation (RL-SFE). Loosely speaking, in an RL-SFE protocol participants can monitor and limit the number of distinct inputs (i.e., rate) used by their counterparts in multiple executions of an SFE, in a private and verifiable manner. The need for RL-SFE naturally arises in a variety of scenarios: e.g., it enables service providers to “meter” their customers’ usage without compromising their privacy, or can be used to prevent oracle attacks against SFE constructions. We consider three variants of RL-SFE providing different levels of security. As a stepping stone, we also formalize the notion of commit-first SFE (CF-SFE) wherein parties are committed to their inputs before each SFE execution. We provide compilers for transforming any CF-SFE protocol into each of the three RL-SFE variants. Our compilers are accompanied with simulation-based proofs of security in the standard model and show a clear tradeoff between the level of security offered and the overhead required. Moreover, motivated by the fact that in many client-server applications clients do not keep state, we also describe a general approach for transforming the resulting RL-SFE protocols into stateless ones. As a case study, we take a closer look at the oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) protocol of Hazay and Lindell, show that it is commit-first, and instantiate efficient ratelimited variants of it.
2016
Oracle attacks; Secure function evaluation; Secure metering; Theoretical Computer Science
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Rate-limited secure function evaluation / Dagdelen, Özgür; Mohassel, Payman; Venturi, Daniele. - In: THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE. - ISSN 0304-3975. - 653:(2016), pp. 53-78. [10.1016/j.tcs.2016.09.020]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/958651
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