We define a new protocol rule, Now or Never (NoN), for bilateral negotiation processes which allows self-motivated competitive agents to efficiently carry out multi-variable negotiations with remote untrusted parties, where privacy is a major concern and agents know nothing about their opponent. By building on the geometric concepts of convexity and convex hull, NoN ensures a continuous progress of the negotiation, thus neutralising malicious or inefficient opponents. In particular, NoN allows an agent to derive in a finite number of steps, and independently of the behaviour of the opponent, that there is no hope to find an agreement. To be able to make such an inference, the interested agent may rely on herself only, still keeping the highest freedom in the choice of her strategy. We also propose an actual NoN-compliant strategy for an automated agent and evaluate the computational feasibility of the overall approach on both random negotiation scenarios and case studies of practical size.

Now or never: negotiating efficiently with unknown or untrusted counterparts / Mancini, Toni. - In: FUNDAMENTA INFORMATICAE. - ISSN 0169-2968. - STAMPA. - 149:1-2(2016), pp. 61-100. [10.3233/FI-2016-1443]

Now or never: negotiating efficiently with unknown or untrusted counterparts

MANCINI, Toni
2016

Abstract

We define a new protocol rule, Now or Never (NoN), for bilateral negotiation processes which allows self-motivated competitive agents to efficiently carry out multi-variable negotiations with remote untrusted parties, where privacy is a major concern and agents know nothing about their opponent. By building on the geometric concepts of convexity and convex hull, NoN ensures a continuous progress of the negotiation, thus neutralising malicious or inefficient opponents. In particular, NoN allows an agent to derive in a finite number of steps, and independently of the behaviour of the opponent, that there is no hope to find an agreement. To be able to make such an inference, the interested agent may rely on herself only, still keeping the highest freedom in the choice of her strategy. We also propose an actual NoN-compliant strategy for an automated agent and evaluate the computational feasibility of the overall approach on both random negotiation scenarios and case studies of practical size.
2016
Automated Negotiation; Rational Selfish Agents; Unmediated Agent Negotiation; Theoretical Computer Science; Algebra and Number Theory; Information Systems; Computational Theory and Mathematics
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Now or never: negotiating efficiently with unknown or untrusted counterparts / Mancini, Toni. - In: FUNDAMENTA INFORMATICAE. - ISSN 0169-2968. - STAMPA. - 149:1-2(2016), pp. 61-100. [10.3233/FI-2016-1443]
File allegati a questo prodotto
File Dimensione Formato  
Mancini_now_2016.pdf

solo gestori archivio

Note: Articolo principale
Tipologia: Versione editoriale (versione pubblicata con il layout dell'editore)
Licenza: Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione 764.91 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
764.91 kB Adobe PDF   Contatta l'autore

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/936784
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 10
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 5
social impact