We define a supervised market mechanism to deal with the airport slot allocation problem. This mechanism is based on the principles underlying the AIP model for regulation of radio spectrum. Incentive prices for airport slots should reflect an estimate of the marginal value of each slot to end users. We compute this value by assessing the downgrade in the provision of the air transport service, both in terms of quantity (i.e. number of transported passengers) and quality (i.e. passenger travel times), should access to any given slot be denied. Incentive prices consider interdependencies among slots at different airports. We argue that, in principle, incentive prices may better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with the outcomes of pure market interactions (such as auctions and trading).

An incentive pricing mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation in Europe / Avenali, Alessandro; D'Alfonso, Tiziana; Leporelli, Claudio; Matteucci, Giorgio; Nastasi, Alberto; Reverberi, Pierfrancesco. - In: JOURNAL OF AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT. - ISSN 0969-6997. - 42:(2015), pp. 27-36. [10.1016/j.jairtraman.2014.07.009]

An incentive pricing mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation in Europe

AVENALI, Alessandro;D'ALFONSO, TIZIANA;LEPORELLI, CLAUDIO;MATTEUCCI, Giorgio;NASTASI, Alberto;REVERBERI, Pierfrancesco
2015

Abstract

We define a supervised market mechanism to deal with the airport slot allocation problem. This mechanism is based on the principles underlying the AIP model for regulation of radio spectrum. Incentive prices for airport slots should reflect an estimate of the marginal value of each slot to end users. We compute this value by assessing the downgrade in the provision of the air transport service, both in terms of quantity (i.e. number of transported passengers) and quality (i.e. passenger travel times), should access to any given slot be denied. Incentive prices consider interdependencies among slots at different airports. We argue that, in principle, incentive prices may better align private and social decisions over the use of slots compared with the outcomes of pure market interactions (such as auctions and trading).
2015
Administered incentive pricing; Airport slot allocation; Congestion; Market mechanisms; Strategy and Management1409 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management; Law; Transportation; Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
An incentive pricing mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation in Europe / Avenali, Alessandro; D'Alfonso, Tiziana; Leporelli, Claudio; Matteucci, Giorgio; Nastasi, Alberto; Reverberi, Pierfrancesco. - In: JOURNAL OF AIR TRANSPORT MANAGEMENT. - ISSN 0969-6997. - 42:(2015), pp. 27-36. [10.1016/j.jairtraman.2014.07.009]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/898480
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