A comparison of two legislative approaches to the pay-as-you-go pension system in terms of adequacy. The Italian case

The aim of our work is to evaluate a new legislative proposal of the Italian pension system due to Giuliano Cazzola e Tiziano Treu and to compare it with the system in force due to former Minister Elsa Fornero. The evaluation is made in terms of adequacy. We make use of a mathematical model which, under the hypothesis of demographic equilibrium, formalizes the legislative changes of the pay-as-you-go pension system. The model is tested using Italian demographic and socio-economic data. The pay-as-you-go pension system in force is notional defined contribution and has the huge drawback that the replacement rate (the ratio between the monthly pension and the last wage perceived by the worker) is very low. We compare the two pension systems evaluating the dynamics of the replacement rate.