I recenti sviluppi della regolazione indipendente in Europa, alla luce del modello organizzativo emerso con l'istituzione dell'acer: alcune riflessioni a margine di una recente sentenza della corte di giustizia e del quadro amministrativo europeo dopo Lisbona

The Agency for the cooperation of energy regulators (Acer) represents an important improvement in the traditional figure of the European regulatory agency, because it creates a new model of European administrative organization. This model is structured on the functioning of European networks and is based on the independence paradigm. The employment of this (new) model can be considered an interesting instrument for the regulation of markets in the EU, solving some structural problems of the political power. However, this can also be a potential threat for the democracy. For these reasons, it is essential to analyze the evolution of Acer and the main features of its model. It is also fundamental to analyze the most important elements and principles of EU primary law and EU secondary law concerning energy regarding the new model as well as significant jurisprudence. In fact, the main aim of this article is to understand, in the light of EU legal framework, positive and negative aspects of this new model in order to offer, if possible, a useful contribution to the general debate of independent regulation in Europe.