Our theory of cultural-institutional persistence and innovation is based on uncoordinated updating of individual social norms and contracts, so that both culture and institutions co-evolve. We explain why Pareto-dominated cultural-institutional configurations may persist over long periods and how transitions nonetheless occur. In our model the exercise of elite power plays no role in either persistence or innovation, and transitions occur endogenously. This is unlike models in which elites impose inferior institutions or cultures as a self-interested distributional strategy. We show that persistence will be greater the more inferior is the Pareto-dominated configuration and the more rational and individualistic is the population.

The persistence of inferior cultural-institutional conventions / Belloc, Marianna; Bowles, Samuel. - In: THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 0002-8282. - STAMPA. - 103:3(2013), pp. 93-98. [10.1257/aer.103.3.93]

The persistence of inferior cultural-institutional conventions

BELLOC, MARIANNA
;
2013

Abstract

Our theory of cultural-institutional persistence and innovation is based on uncoordinated updating of individual social norms and contracts, so that both culture and institutions co-evolve. We explain why Pareto-dominated cultural-institutional configurations may persist over long periods and how transitions nonetheless occur. In our model the exercise of elite power plays no role in either persistence or innovation, and transitions occur endogenously. This is unlike models in which elites impose inferior institutions or cultures as a self-interested distributional strategy. We show that persistence will be greater the more inferior is the Pareto-dominated configuration and the more rational and individualistic is the population.
2013
social norms; contracts; co-evolution
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
The persistence of inferior cultural-institutional conventions / Belloc, Marianna; Bowles, Samuel. - In: THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW. - ISSN 0002-8282. - STAMPA. - 103:3(2013), pp. 93-98. [10.1257/aer.103.3.93]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/851309
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