The book by Mimo Franzinelli, L’arma segreta del Duce, shows the apocryphal character of the so-called “Correspondence Churchill-Mussolini”. In his analysis, Franzinelli makes, however, a serious mistake. The non-authenticity of the correspondence between Churchill and Mussolini, during the spring 1940, to the best our knowledge, does not mean, in fact, as Franzinelli assumed, that, after 18 May, the negotiations between Italian Government and the Allies had ceased. These negotiations continued until May 26, when Churchill and the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud tried to persuade Mussolini to co-operate with France and United Kingdom «in the future Peace conference, in securing a settlement of all European questions, which safeguard the independence and security of the Allies» If Mussolini had accepted this proposal, Churchill and Reynaud would have promised to meet «the fulfillment of the claims of Italy which would in his view ensure the establishment in the Mediterranean of a new order guaranteeing satisfaction of Italian legitimate aspirations in that sea».
Il volume di Mimo Franzinelli, L'arma segreta del Duce, ha rilevato il carattere apocrifo della cosiddetta "Corrispondenza Churchill-Mussolini". Nella sua analisi, Franzinelli commette, però, un grave errore. La non autenticità della corrispondenza tra Churchill e Mussolini, durante la primavera del 1940 non significa, infatti, come ipotizzato da Franzinelli, che, dopo il 18 maggio, i negoziati tra governo italiano e gli Alleati fossero cessati. Le trattative continuarono, invece, fino al 26 maggio, quando Churchill e il Primo ministro francese, Paul Reynaud, tentarono di convincere Mussolini a cooperare con Francia e Regno Unito «in the future Peace conference, in securing a settlement of all European questions, which safeguard the independence and security of the Allies». Se Mussolini avesse accettato tale proposta, Churchill e Reynaud si sarebbero impegnati a garantire «the fulfillment of the claims of Italy which would in his view ensure the establishment in the Mediterranean of a new order guaranteeing satisfaction of Italian legitimate aspirations in that sea».
Il Carteggio Churchill-Mussolini e i National Archives di Londra / DI RIENZO, Pio Eugenio. - In: NUOVA RIVISTA STORICA. - ISSN 0029-6236. - STAMPA. - 3:(2015), pp. 885-895.
Il Carteggio Churchill-Mussolini e i National Archives di Londra
DI RIENZO, Pio Eugenio
2015
Abstract
The book by Mimo Franzinelli, L’arma segreta del Duce, shows the apocryphal character of the so-called “Correspondence Churchill-Mussolini”. In his analysis, Franzinelli makes, however, a serious mistake. The non-authenticity of the correspondence between Churchill and Mussolini, during the spring 1940, to the best our knowledge, does not mean, in fact, as Franzinelli assumed, that, after 18 May, the negotiations between Italian Government and the Allies had ceased. These negotiations continued until May 26, when Churchill and the French Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud tried to persuade Mussolini to co-operate with France and United Kingdom «in the future Peace conference, in securing a settlement of all European questions, which safeguard the independence and security of the Allies» If Mussolini had accepted this proposal, Churchill and Reynaud would have promised to meet «the fulfillment of the claims of Italy which would in his view ensure the establishment in the Mediterranean of a new order guaranteeing satisfaction of Italian legitimate aspirations in that sea».| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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