Etica della comunicazione o dell'argomentazione?

The article offers a particular defense of the twentieth-century linguistic turn, that confers upon communication (of which argumentation is a specific modality) a relevant and fundamental role. The position advocated here may be summarized in the following argumentative threads. Firstly, I describe the cultural framework in which the discourse ethics of K.-O. Apel and J. Habermas emerges, i.e. the debates on the difference between explanation and understanding in the sphere of social sciences and the consensus theory of truth of the above-mentioned authors. Secondly, I address the way in which these thinkers interpret and revise the speech act theory of J.L. Austin and J. R. Searle. Thirdly, I explain why the pragmatic-discursive understanding of communication represents a decisive break with a widespread perspective, that reduces communication to a mere propositional exchange on states of things and mental states. Finally, I criticize the Habermasian approach by showing how it tends to idealize the ordinary communication of lifeworld and consequently to disregard the risks connected to a restricted and/or blocked communication. I conclude that only an adequate theory of meaning is able to establish the criteria and perspectives that the propositional contributions of participants should follow in order that their practical consensus may be qualified and not only factual.