We model cooperative games when externality affects the payoffs of coalitions. The co-alitional games among countries committing to pollution reduction can be easily embedded into such a framework. We evaluate the individual welfare for countries joining the International Environmental Agreements and discuss suitable allocations of welfare depending on the characteristics of the single environmentally-concerned countries. Finally we assess the level of environmental externality beyond which each country’s welfare decreases as its propensity to pollute increases

On Cooperative Games Affected by Negative Externality / Palestini, Arsen; Poggio, Ilaria. - In: JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 0972-0502. - STAMPA. - 18:5(2015), pp. 539-568. [10.1080/09720502.2014.881134]

On Cooperative Games Affected by Negative Externality

PALESTINI, Arsen;
2015

Abstract

We model cooperative games when externality affects the payoffs of coalitions. The co-alitional games among countries committing to pollution reduction can be easily embedded into such a framework. We evaluate the individual welfare for countries joining the International Environmental Agreements and discuss suitable allocations of welfare depending on the characteristics of the single environmentally-concerned countries. Finally we assess the level of environmental externality beyond which each country’s welfare decreases as its propensity to pollute increases
2015
Cooperative games; externality; IEA; power indices
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
On Cooperative Games Affected by Negative Externality / Palestini, Arsen; Poggio, Ilaria. - In: JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY MATHEMATICS. - ISSN 0972-0502. - STAMPA. - 18:5(2015), pp. 539-568. [10.1080/09720502.2014.881134]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/791956
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