The enduring joint decision trap in the absence of European government - Postnational constitutionalism - The dismissal of politics - Accountability of government before parliament at the core of representative democracy - Internalising the benefits and of externalising the disadvantages of staying together in the Union possible as long as political accountability is not ensured in the EU system - Breathing political life into the EU through constitutional practice without formal Treaty amendment - A time-frame for approval of treaty amendments - EP and the election of Commission president Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2013.

The Discourses on Post-National Governance and the Democratic Deficit Absent an EU Government / Pinelli, Cesare. - In: EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW. - ISSN 1574-0196. - STAMPA. - 9:2(2013), pp. 177-188. [10.1017/s1574019612001101]

The Discourses on Post-National Governance and the Democratic Deficit Absent an EU Government

PINELLI, CESARE
2013

Abstract

The enduring joint decision trap in the absence of European government - Postnational constitutionalism - The dismissal of politics - Accountability of government before parliament at the core of representative democracy - Internalising the benefits and of externalising the disadvantages of staying together in the Union possible as long as political accountability is not ensured in the EU system - Breathing political life into the EU through constitutional practice without formal Treaty amendment - A time-frame for approval of treaty amendments - EP and the election of Commission president Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2013.
2013
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
The Discourses on Post-National Governance and the Democratic Deficit Absent an EU Government / Pinelli, Cesare. - In: EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW. - ISSN 1574-0196. - STAMPA. - 9:2(2013), pp. 177-188. [10.1017/s1574019612001101]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/617528
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