We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments. Copyright © 2013 ACM.
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders / Sayan, Bhattacharya; Elias, Koutsoupias; Janardhan, Kulkarni; Leonardi, Stefano; Tim, Roughgarden; Xiaoming, Xu. - STAMPA. - (2013), pp. 91-102. (Intervento presentato al convegno 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013 tenutosi a Philadelphia, PA nel 16 June 2013 through 20 June 2013) [10.1145/2482540.2482555].
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders
LEONARDI, Stefano;
2013
Abstract
We construct prior-free auctions with constant-factor approximation guarantees with ordered bidders, in both unlimited and limited supply settings. We compare the expected revenue of our auctions on a bid vector to the monotone price benchmark, the maximum revenue that can be obtained from a bid vector using supply-respecting prices that are nonincreasing in the bidder ordering and bounded above by the second-highest bid. As a consequence, our auctions are simultaneously near-optimal in a wide range of Bayesian multi-unit environments. Copyright © 2013 ACM.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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