Il mercato e la sua regolazione al vaglio della Corte suprema: Jones c. Harris e la concorrenza come «percorso di conoscenza»

The present article analyzes the Jones c. Harris judgement of the Supreme Court of the United States. In that decision, the Supreme Court overturned the sentence of the Court of Appeal of the Seventh Circuit in which judges Posner and Easterbrook – among the most preeminent representatives of the “Chicago School” – delivered opposite opinions on the interpretation of s. 36 (b) of the Investment Company Act, 1970, an Act dealing with the mutual funds advisers’ fiduciary duties in determining their compensation. The Court of Appeal of the Seventh Circuit determined that the 1982 Gartenberg decision of the Court of Appeal of the Second Circuit – establishing a breach of an adviser’s fiduciary duty if the compensation is not negotiated «at arm’s length in the light of all of the surrounding circumstances» – had to be re-examined. Judge Posner authored a dissenting opinion. Questioning the reasoning of Judges Easterbrook and Posner, based on an accurate understanding of market and governmen

Il presente lavoro analizza la sentenza della Corte suprema statunitense Jones v. Harris. In questa decisione la Corte suprema ha ribaltato una sentenza della Corte di Appello, basata su un altro precedente della Corte suprema, offrendo una particolare visione del mercato che tradisce un'interpretazione divergente dell'Investment Company Act 1970 che si segnala perché sembra rispecchiare una certa visione del mercato e della sua regolazione.