We provide an experimental test of the traveler's dilemma using individual and group data. Our investigation aims to assess whether individual decisions differ significantly from group decisions. Experimental findings reported in this paper show that: (1) groups are always more rational - i.e. their claims are closer to the Nash equilibrium; (2) the size of the penalty/reward influences convergence to the equilibrium both when decisions are taken individually or in groups; and (3) groups are more sensitive to the size of the penalty/reward. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.

Individual and group behaviour in the traveler's dilemma: An experimental study / A., Morone; Piergiuseppe, Morone; Germani, Anna Rita. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 49:(2014), pp. 1-7. [10.1016/j.socec.2014.02.001]

Individual and group behaviour in the traveler's dilemma: An experimental study

GERMANI, Anna Rita
2014

Abstract

We provide an experimental test of the traveler's dilemma using individual and group data. Our investigation aims to assess whether individual decisions differ significantly from group decisions. Experimental findings reported in this paper show that: (1) groups are always more rational - i.e. their claims are closer to the Nash equilibrium; (2) the size of the penalty/reward influences convergence to the equilibrium both when decisions are taken individually or in groups; and (3) groups are more sensitive to the size of the penalty/reward. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.
2014
traveler's dilemma; individual and group decision
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Individual and group behaviour in the traveler's dilemma: An experimental study / A., Morone; Piergiuseppe, Morone; Germani, Anna Rita. - In: JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2214-8043. - 49:(2014), pp. 1-7. [10.1016/j.socec.2014.02.001]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/555414
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