Through the historical and genetic reconstruction of Spaventa’s reflection upon the first logical categories in Hegel’s philosophy, this paper seeks to show how Spaventa broke up the dialectic, while he tried to defend it against the critiques, that several thinkers had moved to it, starting from Trendelenburg. Compared with Gentile’s later position, Spaventa did not notice the idea of a decay of the ‘thought’ into the ‘being’ and never came to unify the form of thought with its matter, the logical act with being. He rather conceived the thought, someway as Kant had done, as the origin of everything – that is, the being would never enter the sphere of determination without the work of the thought.
Through the historical and genetic reconstruction of Spaventa’s reflection upon the first logical categories in Hegel’s philosophy, this paper seeks to show how Spaventa broke up the dialectic, while he tried to defend it against the critiques, that several thinkers had moved to it, starting from Trendelenburg. Compared with Gentile’s later position, Spaventa did not notice the idea of a decay of the ‘thought’ into the ‘being’ and never came to unify the form of thought with its matter, the logical act with being. He rather conceived the thought, someway as Kant had done, as the origin of everything – that is, the being would never enter the sphere of determination without the work of the thought.
Il senso della dialettica nella filosofia di Bertrando Spaventa / Muste', Marcello. - In: GIORNALE DI FILOSOFIA. - ISSN 1827-5834. - ELETTRONICO. - (2014), pp. 1-28.
Il senso della dialettica nella filosofia di Bertrando Spaventa
MUSTE', MARCELLO
2014
Abstract
Through the historical and genetic reconstruction of Spaventa’s reflection upon the first logical categories in Hegel’s philosophy, this paper seeks to show how Spaventa broke up the dialectic, while he tried to defend it against the critiques, that several thinkers had moved to it, starting from Trendelenburg. Compared with Gentile’s later position, Spaventa did not notice the idea of a decay of the ‘thought’ into the ‘being’ and never came to unify the form of thought with its matter, the logical act with being. He rather conceived the thought, someway as Kant had done, as the origin of everything – that is, the being would never enter the sphere of determination without the work of the thought.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
