We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point-record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur.
The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy / Nicita, Antonio; Benedettini, S.. - In: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0144-8188. - STAMPA. - 32:(2012), pp. 256-270. [10.1016/j.irle.2012.02.001]
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Titolo: | The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2012 | |
Rivista: | ||
Citazione: | The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy / Nicita, Antonio; Benedettini, S.. - In: INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 0144-8188. - STAMPA. - 32:(2012), pp. 256-270. [10.1016/j.irle.2012.02.001] | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11573/542289 | |
Appartiene alla tipologia: | 01a Articolo in rivista |