Sextus Empiricus et le τέλoς épicurien : le plaisir est-il par nature digne d’être choisi ?

By paying special attention to two ‘parallel’ texts in Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, III 194-196 and Against the Ethicists, 96-98), this paper aims at examining the reliability of both Sextan reports about one of the most important doctrines put forward by the Epicurean school, namely the key intuition according to which pleasure/ἡδονή is φύσει αἱρετή. Sextus carefully seems to distinguish between Epicurus’s first, original, direct position and the successive refinement of that thesis developed by his followers, maybe forced by external critiques and debates to an additional effort for providing a ‘logical demonstration’ in support of it.