A differential game of extraction of a nonrenewable resource is taken into account, where two firms compete over time and their two terminal times of extraction are two different random variables. The winning firm will be the only one remaining in the game after the first one retires. We explicitly compute the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations of the model and solve them in an asymmetric game with logarithmic payoff structure and linear state dynamics. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
On a Nonrenewable Resource Extraction Game Played by Asymmetric Firms / S., Kostyunin; Palestini, Arsen; E., Shevkoplyas. - In: JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS. - ISSN 0022-3239. - STAMPA. - 163:2(2014), pp. 660-673. [10.1007/s10957-013-0462-x]
On a Nonrenewable Resource Extraction Game Played by Asymmetric Firms
PALESTINI, Arsen;
2014
Abstract
A differential game of extraction of a nonrenewable resource is taken into account, where two firms compete over time and their two terminal times of extraction are two different random variables. The winning firm will be the only one remaining in the game after the first one retires. We explicitly compute the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations of the model and solve them in an asymmetric game with logarithmic payoff structure and linear state dynamics. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media New York.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
