Supposition Theory and Porretan Theology: Summa Zwettlensis and Dialogus Ratii et Everardi

The article investigates how the problem of (linguistic) reference is treated in the theology of two pupils of Gilbert of Poitiers by means of suppo* terms (supponere; suppositus,-a,-um; suppositio). Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of terms, and he considers language as a system for communication between human beings: key notions are the ‘sense in the author’s mind’ and the ‘interpreter’s understanding’. In contrast, the two Porretans tend to objectify language as a formal system of terms. Suppositio becomes in the Summa Zwettlensis the name itself as subject term in a proposition, and is divided into many kinds; formal rules are described which govern the influence of the predicate on the subject term’s denotation. In Everard of Ypres’ Dialogus Ratii et Everardi, supponere is a function (officium) of the name, and ‘human is a species of individuals’ is, as in some logical treatises and differently from Gilbert, a case of rhetorical transfer.