We study the relationship between equilibrium existence and uniqueness in LQ-games, and the classical theory of economic policy. By focusing on system controllability, we find necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium that generalize results in the existing literature. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.
Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games / DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni; Acocella, Nicola; Andrew Hughes, Hallett. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 113:1(2011), pp. 32-34. [10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.052]
Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games
DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni;ACOCELLA, Nicola;
2011
Abstract
We study the relationship between equilibrium existence and uniqueness in LQ-games, and the classical theory of economic policy. By focusing on system controllability, we find necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium that generalize results in the existing literature. © 2011 Elsevier B.V.File allegati a questo prodotto
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