Some sensor network settings involve disconnected or unattended operation with periodic visits by a mobile sink. An unattended sensor network operating in a hostile environment can collect data that represents a high-value target for the adversary. Since an unattended sensor can not immediately off-load sensed data to a safe external entity (such as a sink), the adversary can easily mount a focused attack aiming to erase or modify target data. To maximize chances of data survival, sensors must collaboratively attempt to mislead the adversary and hide the location, the origin, and the contents of collected data. In this paper, we focus on applications of well-known security techniques to maximize chances of data survival in unattended sensor networks, where sensed data can not be off-loaded to a sink in real time. Our investigation yields some interesting insights and surprising results. The highlights of our work are: (1) thorough exploration of the data survival challenge, (2) exploration of the design space for possible solutions, (3) construction of several practical and effective techniques, and (4) their evaluation. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Scheda prodotto non validato
Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo
|Titolo:||Playing hide-and-seek with a focused mobile adversary in unattended wireless sensor networks|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2009|
|Appartiene alla tipologia:||01a Articolo in rivista|