This paper shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for firms' high-skilled workers (for instance, the managers) may induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the paper characterizes the conditions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model without endogenous wages.

Managers compensation and collusive behaviour under cournot oligopoly / Marini, Marco. - In: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 1312-885X. - STAMPA. - 7:1-4(2013), pp. 201-209.

Managers compensation and collusive behaviour under cournot oligopoly

MARINI, MARCO
2013

Abstract

This paper shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for firms' high-skilled workers (for instance, the managers) may induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the paper characterizes the conditions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model without endogenous wages.
2013
collusion; cournot oligopoly; endogenous wages; manager compensation; managers compensation; oligopoly
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Managers compensation and collusive behaviour under cournot oligopoly / Marini, Marco. - In: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 1312-885X. - STAMPA. - 7:1-4(2013), pp. 201-209.
File allegati a questo prodotto
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/499134
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 0
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact