This paper shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for firms' high-skilled workers (for instance, the managers) may induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the paper characterizes the conditions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model without endogenous wages.
Managers compensation and collusive behaviour under cournot oligopoly / Marini, Marco. - In: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 1312-885X. - STAMPA. - 7:1-4(2013), pp. 201-209.
Managers compensation and collusive behaviour under cournot oligopoly
MARINI, MARCO
2013
Abstract
This paper shows that the existence of a concrete outside option for firms' high-skilled workers (for instance, the managers) may induce, under specific circumstances, oligopolistic firms to adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the paper characterizes the conditions under which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing firms behave more collusively than in a standard Cournot model without endogenous wages.File allegati a questo prodotto
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