We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming that every coalition of firms defecting from a cartel can choose its quantity before the remaining firms. We show that differently from [5] the only profitable cartel includes all firms in the industry. This result is shown to be robust to nonlinearity of the profit function, provided that the inverse demand function is not too log-concave.

Sequential play and cartel stability in cournot oligopoly / Sergio, Currarini; Marini, Marco. - In: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 1312-885X. - ELETTRONICO. - 7:1-4(2013), pp. 197-200.

Sequential play and cartel stability in cournot oligopoly

MARINI, MARCO
2013

Abstract

We reconsider the problem of cartel stability in a linear symmetric Cournot oligopoly by assuming that every coalition of firms defecting from a cartel can choose its quantity before the remaining firms. We show that differently from [5] the only profitable cartel includes all firms in the industry. This result is shown to be robust to nonlinearity of the profit function, provided that the inverse demand function is not too log-concave.
2013
cartel formation; core; cournot and stackelberg oligopoly; merger profitability; sequential cartels
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Sequential play and cartel stability in cournot oligopoly / Sergio, Currarini; Marini, Marco. - In: APPLIED MATHEMATICAL SCIENCES. - ISSN 1312-885X. - ELETTRONICO. - 7:1-4(2013), pp. 197-200.
File allegati a questo prodotto
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/499123
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 12
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact