Article XXVI GATT, Annex H GATT; Article XXVII; Article XXVIII GATT, Understanding of the interpretation of the Article XXVIII of the GATT 1994; Article XXVIII bis GATT

Article XXVI: The text of the GATT signed at Geneva on October 30, 1947 was drafted as any self-sufficient international agreement, therefore specifying the modalities of its (definitive) acceptance by the contracting parties and of its (definitive) entry into force, notwithstanding the contextual signature of the Protocol of Provisional Application and the pending coming into existence of the ITO Charter which would have the effect of replace it. Indeed, the provisions of Art. XXVI were not strictly limited to the subject of the acceptance, entry into force and registration, as the title might suggest. Art. XXVI:1 also provided an assessment of the “date of this agreement [i.e. GATT]” which affected the implementation of other GATT provisions. Art. XXVI:5(c) introduced a procedure of accession to the GATT which was alternative to the general one provided in Art. XXXIII, allowing customs territories having gained full autonomy in the conduct of their external commercial relations to accede through sponsorship by an existing contracting party previously responsible for the territory. Art. XXVI was amended several times , with the hidden or declared purpose of encouraging the Contracting Parties to abide definitively by the GATT. During the 1949 Third Session of the CONTRACTING PARTIES at Annecy a Protocol of Terms of Accession was adopted, containing standard terms envisaging a right of acceding governments that were not entitled to accept the General Agreement under Art. XXVI:2, to accede definitely to the GATT at any time after its entry into force following a procedure similar to the one for acceptance contained in Art. XXVI. The Annecy Protocol served as a model for all subsequent accession protocols. In the 1954-1955 Review Session, the CONTRACTING PARTIES agreed on the validity of reservations accompanying an act of acceptance pursuant to Art. XXVI to the effect that Part II of the GATT will be applied to the fullest extent not inconsistent with existing domestic legislation (the “grandfather clause”). The Review Session also resulted in the deletion of the Ad Note Art. XXVI included in the Geneva 1947 text. These amendments did not suffice to convince the Contracting Parties to accept GATT definitely for their concerns, especially those regarding existing legislation, never weakened. Art. XXVI has been superseded by Art. XIV of the Treaty establishing the WTO as far as the subject of acceptance, entry into force and deposit of the agreement is concerned. The provisions of Art. XXVI:1 and of Art. XXVI:5(c) were not continued, and thus do not have a correspondent in the WTO Treaty. On the whole, Art. XXVI has had a limited application. The only provision of this Art. which has had a considerable impact on the asset and functioning of the General Agreement has been para 5(c). Since entering GATT under Art. XXVI:5(c) had produced the undesirable result of making it possible to become Contracting Party without having undertaken significant obligations (for example, if the sponsoring State had previously made limited tariff concessions), Art. XI of the WTO Agreement on original membership, in requiring that all original Members have schedules, was designed to remove this inconvenience, i.e. to ensure that all WTO Members have made tariff and other commitments, even if they had not done so in GATT. Article XXVII: Art. XXVII GATT is self-explanatory. According to this provision, a concession listed in the relevant schedule annexed to the GATT can be withdrawn in whole or in part if the government with which such concession was initially negotiated has not definitely become or has ceased to be a GATT Member. Art. XXVII has so far been invoked with moderate frequency only. From time to time this practice has been engendered by problems of state succession. Article XXVIII: The eight GATT Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have been very successful in reducing customs duties. Over 47 years, the average duty on industrial products imposed by developed countries has impressively decreased from about 40 per cent ad valorem to 3.9 per cent ad valorem.A survey of the Post-Uruguay Round individual tariff structures shows, however, that tariffs are still an important barrier in international trade. Most developing countries have either bound their tariffs at relatively high rates, the average of which ranges between 25 and 50 per cent ad valorem for industrial products, or they have bound only a limited number of items. Developed countries have bound all or most of their non-agricultural tariff lines; their customs duties, which are low on average, show however significant peaks on “sensitive” products such as textiles, clothing and leather goods,which are of particular export interest to developing countries. Least developed countries (LDCs) benefit from preferences by developed countries, though a preferential treatment is similarly accorded to some developing countries and to other developed countries under the provisions of regional trade agreements. Therefore, it is not surprising that an important part of the Doha Round Agenda is still devoted to tariff negotiations. However, as in general the relevance of tariffs as trade barriers has considerably lowered, the interest of the Doha Round negotiators is largely revolving around the elimination or reduction of non-tariff measures and domestic regulatory policies. In this domain, the negotiating efforts made since the Kennedy Round have indeed produced less visible results than those reached through the tariff liberalisation process. Article XXVIIIbis:The eight GATT Rounds of multilateral trade negotiations have been very successful in reducing customs duties. Over 47 years, the average duty on industrial products imposed by developed countries has impressively decreased from about 40 per cent ad valorem to 3.9 per cent ad valorem.A survey of the Post-Uruguay Round individual tariff structures shows, however, that tariffs are still an important barrier in international trade. Most developing countries have either bound their tariffs at relatively high rates, the average of which ranges between 25 and 50 per cent ad valorem for industrial products, or they have bound only a limited number of items. Developed countries have bound all or most of their non-agricultural tariff lines; their customs duties, which are low on average, show however significant peaks on “sensitive” products such as textiles, clothing and leather goods,which are of particular export interest to developing countries. Least developed countries (LDCs) benefit from preferences by developed countries, though a preferential treatment is similarly accorded to some developing countries and to other developed countries under the provisions of regional trade agreements. Therefore, it is not surprising that an important part of the Doha Round Agenda is still devoted to tariff negotiations. However, as in general the relevance of tariffs as trade barriers has considerably lowered, the interest of the Doha Round negotiators is largely revolving around the elimination or reduction of non-tariff measures and domestic regulatory policies. In this domain, the negotiating efforts made since the Kennedy Round have indeed produced less visible results than those reached through the tariff liberalisation process. The Max Planck Commentaries on World Trade Law: WTO, Trade in Goods was reviewed by Sungjoon Cho in the European Journal of International Law 2011, at p. 1209.