This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation / Sergio, Currarini; Marini, Marco. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - STAMPA. - 110:3(2011), pp. 223-225. [10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.039]
Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation
MARINI, MARCO
2011
Abstract
This paper revisits a particular norm of behaviour underlying the well known model of kinked demand. We show that under some standard regularity conditions this norm of behaviour sustains the efficient outcome in all symmetric games. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.File allegati a questo prodotto
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