Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a proxy to convert a ciphertext encrypted under one key into an encryption of the same message under another key. The main idea is to place as little trust and reveal as little information to the proxy as necessary to allow it to perform its translations. At the very least, the proxy should not be able to learn the keys of the participants or the content of the messages it reencrypts. However, in all prior PRE schemes, it is easy for the proxy to determine between which participants a re-encryption key can transform ciphertexts. This can be a problem in practice. For example, in a secure distributed file system, content owners may want to use the proxy to help re-encrypt sensitive information without revealing to the proxy the identity of the recipients. In this work, we propose key-private (or anonymous) re-encryption keys as an additional useful property of PRE schemes. We formulate a definition of what it means for a PRE scheme to be secure and keyprivate. Surprisingly, we show that this property is not captured by prior definitions or achieved by prior schemes, including even the secure obfuscation of PRE by Hohenberger et al. (TCC 2007). Finally, we propose the first key-private PRE construction and prove its CPA-security under a simple extension of Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman assumption and its key-privacy under the Decision Linear assumption in the standard model.
Key-private proxy re-encryption / Ateniese, Giuseppe; Karyn, Benson; Susan, Hohenberger. - 5473(2009), pp. 279-294. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference, CT-RSA 2009 tenutosi a San Francisco, CA nel 20 April 2009 through 24 April 2009.
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|Titolo:||Key-private proxy re-encryption|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2009|
|Citazione:||Key-private proxy re-encryption / Ateniese, Giuseppe; Karyn, Benson; Susan, Hohenberger. - 5473(2009), pp. 279-294. ((Intervento presentato al convegno Cryptographers' Track at the RSA Conference, CT-RSA 2009 tenutosi a San Francisco, CA nel 20 April 2009 through 24 April 2009.|
|Appartiene alla tipologia:||04b Atto di convegno in volume|