La giustificazione pubblica tra giustizia e tolleranza

In the first part I argue that Forst’s books (Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit, 1996; Toleranz im Konflikt, 2003) are aimed at revising and systematizing some philosophical positions advanced in opposition to or as development of John Rawls’s workings; in so doing, I stress that the books I focus on seem to propose themselves as a conciliative and informed reductio ad unum of north-American conceptual categories, theoretic understandings, and ethical-political approaches. In analyzing both the ‘fundamental principle of justification’ advanced by Forst and his attempt to avoid a contextual understanding of Rawls’ theory, I shed light on the fallacies which affect such a way of interpreting, transforming, and re-kantianizing Rawls’s theory. In the second part, I analyze Forst’ thought on toleration; I argue that his way to justify a structured and systematic idea of toleration cannot conceal that the concept of toleration addressed in the book is a concept deeply rooted in a particular tradition. In addition, this strategy is unable to show why different traditions and religious doctrines should be interested in participating in public discussions.