Power analysis of chaos-based random number generator for cryptographic security

In this paper we consider a side-channel attack on a chaos-based Random Number Generator (RNG) based on power consumption analysis. The aim of this attack is to verify if it is possible to retrieve information regarding the internal state of the chaotic system used to generate the random bits. In fact, one of the most common arguments against this kind of RNGs is that, due to the deterministic nature of the chaotic circuit on which they rely, the system cannot be truly unpredictable. Here we analyze the power consumption profile of a chaos-based RNG prototype we designed in 0.35 μm CMOS technology, showing that for the proposed circuit the internal state (and therefore the future evolution) of the system cannot be determined with a side-channel attack based on a power analysis. This property makes the proposed RNG perfectly suitable for high-security cryptographic applications. ©2009 IEEE.