In this paper we consider a side-channel attack on a chaos-based Random Number Generator (RNG) based on power consumption analysis. The aim of this attack is to verify if it is possible to retrieve information regarding the internal state of the chaotic system used to generate the random bits. In fact, one of the most common arguments against this kind of RNGs is that, due to the deterministic nature of the chaotic circuit on which they rely, the system cannot be truly unpredictable. Here we analyze the power consumption profile of a chaos-based RNG prototype we designed in 0.35 μm CMOS technology, showing that for the proposed circuit the internal state (and therefore the future evolution) of the system cannot be determined with a side-channel attack based on a power analysis. This property makes the proposed RNG perfectly suitable for high-security cryptographic applications. ©2009 IEEE.

Power analysis of chaos-based random number generator for cryptographic security / F., Pareschi; Scotti, Giuseppe; Giancane, Luca; R., Rovatti; G., Setti; Trifiletti, Alessandro. - (2009), pp. 2858-2861. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2009 tenutosi a Taipei, twn) [10.1109/ISCAS.2009.5118398].

Power analysis of chaos-based random number generator for cryptographic security

SCOTTI, Giuseppe;GIANCANE, Luca;TRIFILETTI, Alessandro
2009

Abstract

In this paper we consider a side-channel attack on a chaos-based Random Number Generator (RNG) based on power consumption analysis. The aim of this attack is to verify if it is possible to retrieve information regarding the internal state of the chaotic system used to generate the random bits. In fact, one of the most common arguments against this kind of RNGs is that, due to the deterministic nature of the chaotic circuit on which they rely, the system cannot be truly unpredictable. Here we analyze the power consumption profile of a chaos-based RNG prototype we designed in 0.35 μm CMOS technology, showing that for the proposed circuit the internal state (and therefore the future evolution) of the system cannot be determined with a side-channel attack based on a power analysis. This property makes the proposed RNG perfectly suitable for high-security cryptographic applications. ©2009 IEEE.
2009
2009 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2009
RNG, Hardware security, side channel attacks
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04b Atto di convegno in volume
Power analysis of chaos-based random number generator for cryptographic security / F., Pareschi; Scotti, Giuseppe; Giancane, Luca; R., Rovatti; G., Setti; Trifiletti, Alessandro. - (2009), pp. 2858-2861. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2009 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems, ISCAS 2009 tenutosi a Taipei, twn) [10.1109/ISCAS.2009.5118398].
File allegati a questo prodotto
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/378934
 Attenzione

Attenzione! I dati visualizzati non sono stati sottoposti a validazione da parte dell'ateneo

Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 19
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 12
social impact