In the Guy Fawkes protocol, messages on an insecure channel are authenticated without any shared secret or public key. Each part generates a sequence of secret keys and authenticates its commitment to the first key. Then each message is authenticated by hashing with the current key and the commitment to the next one, both to be disclosed afterwards. This mechanism forces two interacting parts to commit to responses before receiving and authenticating the corresponding requests. By consequence, not all the exchanged messages can be significant, but only 1/3 of them. A modified version of the protocol is presented that improves efficiency (1/2 of the messages can be significant) while retaining security.
Improving the efficiency of the interactive Guy Fawkes protocol / Bagini, V; Baiocchi, Andrea; Morgari, G.. - (2006). (Intervento presentato al convegno Forum for Interdisciplinary Mathematics (FIM) XIII (SCRA 2006) tenutosi a Tomar (Portogallo) nel 1-4 settembre 2006).
Improving the efficiency of the interactive Guy Fawkes protocol
BAIOCCHI, Andrea;
2006
Abstract
In the Guy Fawkes protocol, messages on an insecure channel are authenticated without any shared secret or public key. Each part generates a sequence of secret keys and authenticates its commitment to the first key. Then each message is authenticated by hashing with the current key and the commitment to the next one, both to be disclosed afterwards. This mechanism forces two interacting parts to commit to responses before receiving and authenticating the corresponding requests. By consequence, not all the exchanged messages can be significant, but only 1/3 of them. A modified version of the protocol is presented that improves efficiency (1/2 of the messages can be significant) while retaining security.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
