G. W. LEIBNIZ SUL RENDERE SENSIBILE LA CONOSCENZA

G. W. Leibniz’s contribution to logic and a propositional theory of truth, based on the idea that concepts are composed of definitional notes, has been considered the core of his philosophical system and metaphysics. However, Leibniz thought that there are other forms of knowledge that are perceptual and, therefore, non-propositional and non-conceptual. This essay explores forms of non-conceptual knowledge and argues that they depend on the imagination. Despite the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual forms of knowledge, there are two senses in which conceptual knowledge depends on non-conceptual knowledge: there is a constitutive sense in which non-conceptual knowledge has a constitutive function because it allows one to conceive of beings in concreto, and thus anchors human knowledge to reality; there is a second sense in which non-conceptual knowledge has the function of making imaginable intellectual concepts that could not be otherwise represented by the human mind. The essay shows that these functions are interrelated.