Convenzionalismo logico e problema dell’adozione

It is usually thought that logical conventionalism has definitely been defeated. This article illustrates the main criticism that has been raised against logical conventionalism, namely Quine’s argument against logical conventionalism. Then it describes Quine’s anti-exceptionalist view of logic and the criticism raised against such conception of logic by Kripke, which is strictly related to Quine’s criticism of logical conventionalism. Against the claim that a logic can be adopted, Kripke proposes the so-called adoption problem, according to which if one does not infer in accordance with some logical principle, it is impossible for one to adopt such logical principle, while if one already infers in accordance with such logical principle, there is no need for one to adopt it. A criticism of Kripke’s exceptionalist view of logic is presented, which is based on the claim that Kripke misses some important distinctions when discussing about logic. If that criticism of Kripke’s view holds, it might contribute to rescue logical conventionalism.