This essay analyzes the first transoceanic conflict of the United States: the war against the Regency of Tripoli fought from 1801 to 1805. The author examines the shift in American foreign policy under the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, moving from the European strategy of paying tributes to the Barbary "Corsair States" (Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Salā) toward direct military intervention. The objective was twofold: to protect American maritime trade and to establish the United States as a "first-rank" sovereign Nation within the complex Mediterranean landscape. The work challenges the often-celebratory narrative of American historiography, highlighting the structural flaws of the expedition. Significant emphasis is placed on the fundamental role of the Kingdom of Naples, that supplied the Mediterranean Squadron logistical bases, manpower, and military support, continuing the long tradition of anti-Barbary struggle of the other historic Italian States: Venice, Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Papal States, Sovereign Military Order of Malta. The author describes the lack of preparation among American Consuls - often perceived as arrogant and ignorant of local customs - and the severe logistical deficiencies (spoiled rations, lack of accurate charts, lack of a striking force capable of eradicating permanently Tripolitan piracy) that plagued the U.S. Navy Squadron. The essay recounts the loss of the frigate USS Philadelphia, which ran aground due to the incompetence of Captain Bainbridge, marking the lowest point of American prestige during the conflict. A central theme of the essay is the introduction of "Naval Irregular Warfare" (asymmetric naval warfare). Subsequently, the author examines the daring mission of Stephen Decatur who, aboard the ketch Intrepid and with the crucial assistance of the Sicilian pilot Salvatore Catalano, managed to infiltrate Tripoli harbor to burn the Philadelphia, preventing its use by the enemy and the capture of the fortress of Derna by the multiethnic land expeditionary corps, led by William Eaton, a veteran of the First Barbary War, supplied and supported by three vessels under the command of the Captain John Dent. The essay concludes that while the war was marked by logistical and diplomatic challenges, it represented a crucial formative moment in the development of the American national character. The use of force, combined with experiments in unconventional warfare, allowed the United States to begin dismantling the Barbary tribute system, and simultaneously demonstrated the beginning of the end of their subjugation to the great European powers in the Mediterranean and their capacity to engage militarily with the local Maghrebi Rogue States. This conflict, marked by both "splendors and miseries," forged the character of the nascent U.S. Navy within the broader context of the Mediterranean "Great Game."

«From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli». Splendori e miserie della Marina statunitense nella prima guerra contro la pirateria barbaresca 1801-1805 / Di Rienzo, Pio Eugenio. - In: MO.DO. - ISSN 2784-868X. - 1:(2026), pp. 389-440.

«From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli». Splendori e miserie della Marina statunitense nella prima guerra contro la pirateria barbaresca 1801-1805

pio eugenio di rienzo
2026

Abstract

This essay analyzes the first transoceanic conflict of the United States: the war against the Regency of Tripoli fought from 1801 to 1805. The author examines the shift in American foreign policy under the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, moving from the European strategy of paying tributes to the Barbary "Corsair States" (Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Salā) toward direct military intervention. The objective was twofold: to protect American maritime trade and to establish the United States as a "first-rank" sovereign Nation within the complex Mediterranean landscape. The work challenges the often-celebratory narrative of American historiography, highlighting the structural flaws of the expedition. Significant emphasis is placed on the fundamental role of the Kingdom of Naples, that supplied the Mediterranean Squadron logistical bases, manpower, and military support, continuing the long tradition of anti-Barbary struggle of the other historic Italian States: Venice, Grand Duchy of Tuscany, Papal States, Sovereign Military Order of Malta. The author describes the lack of preparation among American Consuls - often perceived as arrogant and ignorant of local customs - and the severe logistical deficiencies (spoiled rations, lack of accurate charts, lack of a striking force capable of eradicating permanently Tripolitan piracy) that plagued the U.S. Navy Squadron. The essay recounts the loss of the frigate USS Philadelphia, which ran aground due to the incompetence of Captain Bainbridge, marking the lowest point of American prestige during the conflict. A central theme of the essay is the introduction of "Naval Irregular Warfare" (asymmetric naval warfare). Subsequently, the author examines the daring mission of Stephen Decatur who, aboard the ketch Intrepid and with the crucial assistance of the Sicilian pilot Salvatore Catalano, managed to infiltrate Tripoli harbor to burn the Philadelphia, preventing its use by the enemy and the capture of the fortress of Derna by the multiethnic land expeditionary corps, led by William Eaton, a veteran of the First Barbary War, supplied and supported by three vessels under the command of the Captain John Dent. The essay concludes that while the war was marked by logistical and diplomatic challenges, it represented a crucial formative moment in the development of the American national character. The use of force, combined with experiments in unconventional warfare, allowed the United States to begin dismantling the Barbary tribute system, and simultaneously demonstrated the beginning of the end of their subjugation to the great European powers in the Mediterranean and their capacity to engage militarily with the local Maghrebi Rogue States. This conflict, marked by both "splendors and miseries," forged the character of the nascent U.S. Navy within the broader context of the Mediterranean "Great Game."
2026
first barbary war; U.S. Navy; asymmetric warfare; Mediterranean great game
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«From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli». Splendori e miserie della Marina statunitense nella prima guerra contro la pirateria barbaresca 1801-1805 / Di Rienzo, Pio Eugenio. - In: MO.DO. - ISSN 2784-868X. - 1:(2026), pp. 389-440.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1767982
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