Superstition and decision-making: how superstitious beliefs and rituals affect choices under risk

Pseudoscience represents a series of beliefs, ideas and practices that are incompatible with the sets of rules, behaviours and procedures described by the scientific method. Nonetheless, pseudoscientific ideas continue to be spread and followed, often leading to possibly harmful pieces of disinformation, fake news and scepticism towards actual scientific findings. Their success is determined not only by disinformation itself, but also by their tendency to tap into intuitive forms of thinking and common cognitive shortcuts. Among the diverse faces of pseudoscience, superstition occupies a unique position: while often perceived as harmless or a form of cultural heritage, it reflects similar psychological processes that underlie other irrational or non-scientific beliefs. The present dissertation investigates superstition as a psychological and behavioural phenomenon, examining its closeness with individual differences in reasoning, decision-making, and susceptibility to other irrational beliefs. Across two different studies, the relationship between superstition and loss aversion, from a prospect theory standpoint, has been examined. First, superstition has been investigated as a series of beliefs linked to Italian culture and customs, trying to understand how it could impact loss aversion in a risky decision-making task. Then, a more cognitive approach has been adopted, implying a causal illusion task as a proxy for superstition; in other words, the tendency to detect causal relationship between events that are merely contingent was referenced as the thought process behind superstitious beliefs formation. Again, the relationship with loss aversion was the main interest of this second study. Results show that superstition can in fact affect decision-making in a nuanced, still not completely understood way. These results contribute to a more complex understanding of loss aversion, adding to a body of evidence about individual differences and decision-making; they also shed light on a topic that is often ignored and that would need more attention to be fully understood. By considering superstition within the broader scope of pseudoscientific beliefs, this dissertation highlights the psychological mechanisms that might sustain irrational beliefs and their potential to influence decision-making in everyday contexts. In conclusion, this contribution also adds to an ongoing conversation about decision-making styles and biases, pseudoscience as a resilient and widespread issue to address, and, consequently, about strategies that might encourage more critical and reflective ways of thinking.