There has been substantial growth in the UAV market along with an expansion in their applications. However, the successful execution of a UAV mission is very often dependent on the use of a GNSS. Unfortunately, the vulnerability of GNSS signals, due to their lack of encryption and authentication, poses a significant cybersecurity issue. This vulnerability makes various attacks, particularly the 'GNSS spoofing attack,' and 'GNSS jamming attack' easily executable. Generally speaking, during this attack, the drone is manipulated into altering its path, usually resulting in an immediate forced landing or crash. As far as we know, we are the first to propose a lightweight-solution that enable a drone to autonomously rescue itself, assuming it is under GNSS attack and the GNSS is no longer available, and return safely to its initial takeoff position, thereby preventing any potential crashes. During the flight, wind plays a critical role as it can instantaneously alter the drone's position. To solve this problem, we have devised a highly effective 2-phases solution: (i) Forward Phase, for monitoring and recording the forward journey, and (ii) Backward Phase, that generates a backward route, based on the Forward Phase and wind presence. The final solution ensures strong performance in consistently returning the drone to the original position, even in wind situations, while maintaining a very fast computation time.

Towards a Self-Rescuing System for UAVs Under GNSS Attack / Rigoni, Giulio; Scremin, Nicola; Conti, Mauro. - (2024), pp. 339-346. ( 20th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, WiMob 2024 Paris; France ) [10.1109/wimob61911.2024.10770344].

Towards a Self-Rescuing System for UAVs Under GNSS Attack

Rigoni, Giulio
Primo
;
Conti, Mauro
Ultimo
2024

Abstract

There has been substantial growth in the UAV market along with an expansion in their applications. However, the successful execution of a UAV mission is very often dependent on the use of a GNSS. Unfortunately, the vulnerability of GNSS signals, due to their lack of encryption and authentication, poses a significant cybersecurity issue. This vulnerability makes various attacks, particularly the 'GNSS spoofing attack,' and 'GNSS jamming attack' easily executable. Generally speaking, during this attack, the drone is manipulated into altering its path, usually resulting in an immediate forced landing or crash. As far as we know, we are the first to propose a lightweight-solution that enable a drone to autonomously rescue itself, assuming it is under GNSS attack and the GNSS is no longer available, and return safely to its initial takeoff position, thereby preventing any potential crashes. During the flight, wind plays a critical role as it can instantaneously alter the drone's position. To solve this problem, we have devised a highly effective 2-phases solution: (i) Forward Phase, for monitoring and recording the forward journey, and (ii) Backward Phase, that generates a backward route, based on the Forward Phase and wind presence. The final solution ensures strong performance in consistently returning the drone to the original position, even in wind situations, while maintaining a very fast computation time.
2024
20th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, WiMob 2024
Cyber-security; Drone; GNSS Attack Countermeasure; UAV; Wind
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04b Atto di convegno in volume
Towards a Self-Rescuing System for UAVs Under GNSS Attack / Rigoni, Giulio; Scremin, Nicola; Conti, Mauro. - (2024), pp. 339-346. ( 20th International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, Networking and Communications, WiMob 2024 Paris; France ) [10.1109/wimob61911.2024.10770344].
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Note: DOI: 10.1109/WiMob61911.2024.10770344
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1754001
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