Elezione diretta e rapporti tra Capo dello Stato e Presidente del Consiglio dei ministri. Per un'equilibrata razionalizzazione della forma di governo. La problematica dello scioglimento anticipato delle Camere

This contribution, after briefly outlining the characteristics that the institution of early dissolution has assumed in Italian constitutional history, analyzes the constitutional bill on the so-called elective premiership in the version approved by the Senate, with particular reference to its source of inspiration—namely, the simul simul model, which has been operating at the subnational level for over twenty-five years. By comparing this model with the intermediate level of government (not only in Italy), it becomes clear that the systemic needs of the national form of government are different and that the rigidity introduced by the direct election of the head of the executive should allow room for different incentives and instruments of parliamentary rationalization—primarily, the rules on dissolution—while at the same time preserving the role of the Head of State as a reserve power in potential periods of crisis.