Inside the Seveso directive via a systems-theoretic model: a way forward for ruling industrial safety management

Numerous European industrial facilities are involved in the storing, handling, production, or – generally – use of dangerous substances. They have the potential to cause major accidents with severe consequences for humans, facilities, and the environment. To prevent major accidents and mitigate their consequences, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have published the Directive 2012/18/EU (also known as the Seveso III Directive). This Directive establishes the general obligations of the operators of industrial establishments within its scope and requires adopting a Major-Accident Prevention Policy and implementing a Safety Management System. The safety management in such establishments is yet a challenging task, and, even if the Directive's prescriptions are meant to increase safety, they bring additional complexity to the equation. This paper aims to investigate how a systemic approach supports the representation of safety management practices in establishments under the Directive, and to explore how the interactions among the stakeholders involved influence the implementation and effectiveness of such safety management practices. For such purposes, the System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) principles are adopted to map all the relationships among the agents (from the European authorities to the operator of the establishment). The resulting Safety Control Structure had been developed through an analysis of documents, a set of semi-structured interviews, and a final focus group with subject-matter experts. The obtained results argue how systemic approaches represent a valuable support to capture socio-technical complexity, supporting the safety management of safety–critical industrial settings.