This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion.
Cartel stability with quality-anchored buyers / Bos, Iwan; Cesi, Berardino; Marini, Marco A.. - In: ECONOMICS LETTERS. - ISSN 0165-1765. - 254:(2025). [10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112449]
Cartel stability with quality-anchored buyers
Cesi, BerardinoMembro del Collaboration Group
;Marini, Marco A.Membro del Collaboration Group
2025
Abstract
This note examines cartel stability in a vertically differentiated duopoly with quality-anchored buyers. It is shown that such buyers are a facilitating factor for collusion.File allegati a questo prodotto
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