The essay moves from a reconstruction of the political party financing system and some reform efforts (successful or only attempted) in order to highlight how the current system favors incumbent parties and profoundly conditions political participation. In particular, it is highlighted how the mechanism of (indirect) public financing of politics realizes a real inequality within the representational paradigm, favoring political parties that advocate the interests of the wealthy electorate, at the expense of the equal social dignity of the consociates.
Finanziamento dei partiti politici vs. eguaglianza del voto. Quando la partecipazione politica cede al potere fiscale / Piacentini Vernata, Andrea. - In: POLITICA DEL DIRITTO. - ISSN 0032-3063. - (2025), pp. 101-122.
Finanziamento dei partiti politici vs. eguaglianza del voto. Quando la partecipazione politica cede al potere fiscale
Andrea Piacentini Vernata
Primo
2025
Abstract
The essay moves from a reconstruction of the political party financing system and some reform efforts (successful or only attempted) in order to highlight how the current system favors incumbent parties and profoundly conditions political participation. In particular, it is highlighted how the mechanism of (indirect) public financing of politics realizes a real inequality within the representational paradigm, favoring political parties that advocate the interests of the wealthy electorate, at the expense of the equal social dignity of the consociates.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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