Seminal studies show that inconsistency between detectors and deceivers, in ideological opinion on controversial topics, impairs lie detection. In the forensic field, however, deceptions refer more to personal experience, than ideological opinions. To directly test the impact of agreement for personally vs. ideologically justified opinions as a modulator of accuracy in detecting deception, forty-eight statements (half true) were recorded in videos, and randomly administered in Experiment 1 to 102 participants (56 females). Each statement reported an opinion (agree vs. disagree) and its justification (personal vs. ideological). In Experiment 2 (ongoing), each video is presented in two parts (opinion and justification). Participants (n = 180) are assessed for the base rate of their ability to detect deception, assigned to a sequential vs. random order of exposure to the videos, and asked tojudge each stimulus as truthful vs. deceitful. While self-referential processes were shown to impair the detection of ideological lies, in Experiment 1 we show that the effect of self-referential processes extends to personally justified lies, and opinion content specifically predict the detection accuracy for personal vs. ideological account. In Experiment 2, we expect the random order presentation improves performance in the inconsistent situations. The study reveals the complex, non-univocal role of self-referencing in detecting deception.
The role of self-referential processes in deception detection / Convertino, Gianmarco; Mazzoni, Giuliana. - (2024). (Intervento presentato al convegno Behavioral Neuroscience Conference tenutosi a Rome; Italy).
The role of self-referential processes in deception detection
Gianmarco Convertino
Primo
;Giuliana MazzoniUltimo
2024
Abstract
Seminal studies show that inconsistency between detectors and deceivers, in ideological opinion on controversial topics, impairs lie detection. In the forensic field, however, deceptions refer more to personal experience, than ideological opinions. To directly test the impact of agreement for personally vs. ideologically justified opinions as a modulator of accuracy in detecting deception, forty-eight statements (half true) were recorded in videos, and randomly administered in Experiment 1 to 102 participants (56 females). Each statement reported an opinion (agree vs. disagree) and its justification (personal vs. ideological). In Experiment 2 (ongoing), each video is presented in two parts (opinion and justification). Participants (n = 180) are assessed for the base rate of their ability to detect deception, assigned to a sequential vs. random order of exposure to the videos, and asked tojudge each stimulus as truthful vs. deceitful. While self-referential processes were shown to impair the detection of ideological lies, in Experiment 1 we show that the effect of self-referential processes extends to personally justified lies, and opinion content specifically predict the detection accuracy for personal vs. ideological account. In Experiment 2, we expect the random order presentation improves performance in the inconsistent situations. The study reveals the complex, non-univocal role of self-referencing in detecting deception.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.