We propose the first black-box construction of non-malleable commitments according to the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. Our construction additionally only requires a constant number of rounds and is based only on (black-box use of) one-way functions. Prior to our work, no black-box construction of non-malleable commitments was known (except for relaxed notions of security) in any (polynomial) number of rounds based on any cryptographic assumption. This closes the wide gap existent between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitments. Our construction relies on (and can be seen as a generalization of) the recent non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal (STOC 2011). We also show how to get black-box constructions for a host of other cryptographic primitives. We extend our construction to get constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitments, constant-round multi-party coin tossing, and non-malleable statistically hiding commitments (satisfying the notion of non-malleability with respect to opening). All of the mentioned results make only a black-box use of one-way functions. Our primary technical contribution is a novel way of implementing the proof of consistency typically required in the constructions of non-malleable commitments (and other related primitives). We do this by relying on ideas from the “zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation” paradigm of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). We extend in a novel way this “computation in the head” paradigm (which can be though of as bringing powerful error-correcting codes into purely computational setting). To construct a non-malleable commitment scheme, we apply our computation in the head techniques to the recent (constant-round) construction of Goyal. Along the way, we also present a simplification of the construction of Goyal where a part of the protocol is implemented in an information theoretic manner. Such a simplification is crucial for getting a black-box construction. This is done by making use of pairwise-independent hash functions and strong randomness extractors. We show that our techniques have multiple applications, as elaborated in the paper. Hence, we believe our techniques might be useful in other settings in future.

Constructing Non-Malleable Commitments: A Black-Box Approach / Vipul, Goyal; Chen Kuei, Lee; Rafail, Ostrovsky; Visconti, Ivan. - (2012), pp. 51-60. (Intervento presentato al convegno FOCS, 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science tenutosi a New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA).

Constructing Non-Malleable Commitments: A Black-Box Approach

VISCONTI, Ivan
2012

Abstract

We propose the first black-box construction of non-malleable commitments according to the standard notion of non-malleability with respect to commitment. Our construction additionally only requires a constant number of rounds and is based only on (black-box use of) one-way functions. Prior to our work, no black-box construction of non-malleable commitments was known (except for relaxed notions of security) in any (polynomial) number of rounds based on any cryptographic assumption. This closes the wide gap existent between black-box and non-black-box constructions for the problem of non-malleable commitments. Our construction relies on (and can be seen as a generalization of) the recent non-malleable commitment scheme of Goyal (STOC 2011). We also show how to get black-box constructions for a host of other cryptographic primitives. We extend our construction to get constant-round concurrent non-malleable commitments, constant-round multi-party coin tossing, and non-malleable statistically hiding commitments (satisfying the notion of non-malleability with respect to opening). All of the mentioned results make only a black-box use of one-way functions. Our primary technical contribution is a novel way of implementing the proof of consistency typically required in the constructions of non-malleable commitments (and other related primitives). We do this by relying on ideas from the “zero-knowledge from secure multi-party computation” paradigm of Ishai, Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai (STOC 2007). We extend in a novel way this “computation in the head” paradigm (which can be though of as bringing powerful error-correcting codes into purely computational setting). To construct a non-malleable commitment scheme, we apply our computation in the head techniques to the recent (constant-round) construction of Goyal. Along the way, we also present a simplification of the construction of Goyal where a part of the protocol is implemented in an information theoretic manner. Such a simplification is crucial for getting a black-box construction. This is done by making use of pairwise-independent hash functions and strong randomness extractors. We show that our techniques have multiple applications, as elaborated in the paper. Hence, we believe our techniques might be useful in other settings in future.
2012
FOCS, 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
04 Pubblicazione in atti di convegno::04b Atto di convegno in volume
Constructing Non-Malleable Commitments: A Black-Box Approach / Vipul, Goyal; Chen Kuei, Lee; Rafail, Ostrovsky; Visconti, Ivan. - (2012), pp. 51-60. (Intervento presentato al convegno FOCS, 53rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science tenutosi a New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA).
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1718857
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