Perfectionism and perceptive equilibrium: Cavell and Nussbaum on style and ethical method

In Love's Knowledge, Martha Nussbaum defends the claim that literary works are essential to moral philosophy through her account of perceptive equilibrium. Perceptive equilibrium provides for Nussbaum a maximally inclusive conception of ethical inquiry, likely to be endorsed by philosophers of diverse orientations. Since perceptive equilibrium implies an acknowledgement of the significance of novels for moral thinking, those who are prepared to endorse perceptive equilibrium are also committed to accept Nussbaum's claim about the significance of novels. I argue that perceptive equilibrium, Nussbaum's claims of inclusiveness notwithstanding, systematically rules out a certain register of moral concerns, which takes pride of place in Stanley Cavell's writings on Perfectionism. The omission of Perfectionism is important not only because it provides a counterexample to Nussbaum's claim of inclusiveness, but also because one of the burdens of Cavell's work on Perfectionism is to provide an account of the ethical significance of style. For this reason, the exclusion of Perfectionism goes against the deeper motivations of Nussbaum's argument: Nussbaum, in outlining a method with the explicit aim of arguing for the moral significance of style, is supporting a picture of moral thinking which makes a specific dimension of this significance unaccountable