Il sapere come anima ed eros. Heidegger e il Teeteto di Platone

This article aims to clarify Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s Theaetetus, as it is exposed in the course of the 1931-32, titled Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet. In this reading Heidegger translates the greek ἐπιστήμη with Wissen, knowledge, and tries to show that the ἐπιστήμη is not the scientific knowledge on which is based the philosophy as theory of knowledge. If however knowledge as ἐπιστήμη is not the scientific knowledge, according to the modern meaning, and if the Theaetetus is not actually a gnoseological dialogue, what is then the true answer to the Plato’s question here exposed: τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη? In order to seek it, Heidegger will question on the αἴσθησις, the perception, in its fundamental relationship with the ἀλήθεια, the being’s unconcealment, reaching to say that the knowledge itself as ἐπιστήμη originally is soul, as idea, and eros, as tension of being, rather than scientific knowledge or science in general.