Terrorist Attacks for Fake Exposure Notifications in Contact Tracing Systems

In this work we show that an adversary can attack the integrity of contact tracing systems based on Google-Apple Exposure Notifications (GAEN) by leveraging blockchain technology. We show that through smart contracts there can be an on-line market where infected individuals interested in monetizing their status can upload to the servers of the GAEN-based systems some keys (i.e., TEKs) chosen by a non-infected adversary. In particular, the infected individual can anonymously and digitally trade the upload of TEKs without a mediator and without running risks of being cheated. This vulnerability can therefore be exploited to generate large-scale fake exposure notifications of at-risk contacts with serious consequences (e.g., jeopardizing parts of the health system, affecting results of elections, imposing the closure of schools, hotels or factories).As main contribution, we design a smart contract with two collateral deposits that works, in general, on GAEN-based systems. We then also suggest the design of a more sophisticated smart contract, using DECO, that could be used to attack in a different way GAEN-based systems (i.e., this second smart contract can succeed even in case GAEN systems are repaired making ineffective the first smart contract).Our work shows how to realize with GAEN-based systems (in particular with Immuni and SwissCovid), the terrorist attack to decentralized contact tracing systems envisioned by Vaudenay.