Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.

Promises and partner-switch / DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni; Dufwenberg, Martin; Papa, Stefano. - In: JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION. - ISSN 2199-6784. - 9:(2023), pp. 77-89. [10.1007/s40881-023-00128-4]

Promises and partner-switch

Giovanni Di Bartolomeo
;
Martin Dufwenberg;Stefano Papa
2023

Abstract

Building on a partner-switching mechanism, we experimentally test two theories that posit different reasons why promises breed trust and cooperation. The expectation-based explanation (EBE) operates via belief-dependent guilt aversion, while the commitment-based explanation (CBE) suggests that promises offer commitment power via a (belief-independent) preference to keep one’s word. Previous research performed a similar test, which we argue should be interpreted as concerning informal agreements rather than (unilateral) promises.
2023
guilt aversion; experimental economics; psychological games
01 Pubblicazione su rivista::01a Articolo in rivista
Promises and partner-switch / DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni; Dufwenberg, Martin; Papa, Stefano. - In: JOURNAL OF THE ECONOMIC SCIENCE ASSOCIATION. - ISSN 2199-6784. - 9:(2023), pp. 77-89. [10.1007/s40881-023-00128-4]
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11573/1698248
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