Electronic Attacks as a Cyber False Flag against Maritime Radars Systems

Radar systems have long been essential for safe navigation in various transportation sectors, including aviation, maritime, and automotive. While these systems provide invaluable situational awareness and decision-making capabilities, they increasingly become targets for malicious actors aiming to disrupt their normal operations. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) have traditionally been the predominant form of attack. However, recent findings have uncovered their vulnerability to cyber-based actions, capitalizing on their digitization and network connectivity. In this paper, we propose a novel threat model that exploits cyber attack capabilities against radar systems to simulate the effects of ECM. This model goes beyond known attacks by introducing a deceptive element, challenging attribution. To evaluate the feasibility of these attacks, extensive experimentation is conducted using a realistic case study involving the maritime domain. Through this research, we aim to highlight the evolving threats facing radar systems and the need for comprehensive security measures.